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This Paper seeks to explore the complex dynamics of illicit trade, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Paper seeks to examine the issue of trademark counterfeiting 
through the lens of illicit trade, particularly looking at the legal structure 
in the United States (“U.S.”) and in select countries in the Middle East. It 
will also explore the addition of legal complexity of Free Trade Zones 
(“FTZs”) in the Middle East and the movement toward online 
marketplaces. Illicit trade has been occurring since antiquity, as shown 
by letters from the Assyrian Empire to efforts in ancient Greece and 
Rome to authenticate goods through trademarks in the Aztec Empire.1 
Post-antiquity illicit trade has continued to grow, morph, and be mingled 
with political dimensions, such as the trade in intellectual thought 
(smuggling of books in Sixteenth century France),2 state-building 
(smuggling of goods for war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire),3 
resistance (American colonists smuggling to resist British tax policies 
and rule),4 and goods in diaspora communities.5 
The current state of illicit trade, particularly in the Middle East, can be 
traced back to remnants of artificial boundaries set up by colonial powers 
and the Ottoman Empire to rule their conquered lands, which had the 
effect of cutting off traditional trade paths and creating artificial 
boundaries for which local populations had no respect.6 Of illegal drug 
trade, trade and smuggling in humans, weapons, and others, two of the 
top two revenue generators are: (1) the production and sale of counterfeit 
products, and (2) illegal trade in intellectual property that only emerged 
with the industrial revolution.7 This Paper will be focusing on one of the 
top revenue generators in illicit trade: the production and sale of 
trademark counterfeits.   
As noted above, the history of trade, colonization, and conquest of 
each area has already had an impact on what trade routes exist and often 
whether they are considered licit or illicit.  However, additional layers of 
  
 1. LOUISE I. SHELLEY, DARK COMMERCE: HOW A NEW ILLICIT ECONOMY IS 
THREATENING OUR FUTURE 17–20 (2018). 
 2. Id. at 28. 
 3. Id.   
 4. Id. at 28–29. 
 5. Id. at 31–32. 
 6. Id. at 39.  
 7. Id. at 48.  
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factors including the economy, the political situation, and society also 
play a major role in the movement of illegal goods.8 This Paper seeks to 
explore the legal culture and legal framework that purports to limit the 
movement of illegal goods. In some cultures, or from some perspectives, 
there is an official or unofficial perception of a benefit of counterfeit 
products,9 without regard to the detriment, or possibly in spite of it.  
This Paper will initially examine (I) the perceived benefits of 
trademark counterfeiting and the harm caused by trademark 
counterfeiting to set the stage for the need for a legal framework to 
enforce trademarks; from there, the Paper will explore (II) two main 
jurisdictions’ legal frameworks for criminal prosecution of trademark 
counterfeiting, the U.S. and the United Arab Emirates; next, the Paper 
will discuss (III) Free Trades Zones (FTZs), corruption and culture in the 
United Arab Emirates to see the impact and interplay they have with 
counterfeits; and finally, the Paper will conclude by examining (IV) 
technology and its relationship to the evolution of trademark 
counterfeiting. 
A. The Perceived Benefits of Trademark Counterfeiting  
In many global cultures, local protectionism10 provides a space for 
product counterfeiting and the illegal trade of intellectual property. The 
  
 8. See Louise Shelley, Illicit Trade and Our Global Response, FOREIGN SERV. J., 
Oct. 2018, at 22, 24, 
https://www.afsa.org/sites/default/files/flipping_book/1018/index.html. 
 9. See, e.g., Yi Qian, Counterfeiters: Foes or Friends? How Counterfeits Affect 
Sales by Product Quality Tier, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2381, 2381 (2014) (noting the research 
finding that counterfeiting “could have positive spillover effects on authentic sales”).  See 
also Felix Tang et al., Understanding Counterfeit Consumption, 26 ASIA PAC. J. MKT. & 
LOGISTICS, 4, 4 (2014) (discussing findings amongst consumer motivation study 
conducted in Hong Kong finding that motivation for counterfeit purchases included 
“utility (35 percent) received from the good over the genuine article[,] . . . perceived risk 
involved in the purchase (22 percent),” social norms (10 percent), confusion (10 percent), 
and ethical concerns (10 percent), and “at less than 4 percent each, were culture, habit, 
and desire to explore”). 
 10. See Daniel Chow’s definition of local protectionism, “‘Local protectionism’ 
refers to the role of local governments in protecting illegal activity by failing to fully 
enforce the law. Note that under the definitions set forth above, some forms of local 
protectionism may also be considered forms of organized crime.” Daniel Chow, 
Organized Crime, Local Protectionism, and the Trade in Counterfeit Goods in China, 14 
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reason for local protectionism can vary widely. Additionally, the 
differences between collectivist or individualist societies11 can impact 
how the societies may view intellectual property protections.12 A wide 
variety of legitimate and illegitimate reasons exist for local 
protectionism,  manifestations of collectivism, and individualism, and 
often, the reasons involve impact on the manufacturing and sale of 
counterfeit goods exist. These reasons have included: economic inability 
to afford a branded product but having access to a counterfeit; 
counterfeits helping a startup to build up capital before being able to 
create their own intellectual property; perceived status of a consumer 
who buys a counterfeit brand that they cannot afford or do not want to 
invest in; availability of counterfeit product in a market where the 
authentic brand does not sell; lower prices from neighboring markets; 
revenue generation and job creation; and many others.13 
B. The Harm 
Despite the possible positive reasons for an individual, company, or 
society to engage in counterfeit, the harm caused by trademark 
  
CHINA ECON. REV. 473, 473 (2003). See also Protectionism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019) (“The protection of domestic businesses and industries against foreign 
competition by imposing high tariffs and restricting imports.”); Robert W. Kerns Jr., The 
Counterfeit Food Crisis in China: A Systemic Problem and Possible Solutions, 41 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. 573, 587–89 (2016).  
 11. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew, A Case of Motivated Cultural Cognition: China’s 
Normative Arbitration of International Business Disputes, 51 INT’L LAW. 469, 475 (2018) 
(comparing the perspective of a collectivist vs. individualist society). 
 12. See, e.g., Farhad Aliyev & Ralf Wagner, Cultural Influence on Luxury Value 
Perceptions: Collectivist vs. Individualist Luxury Perceptions, 30 J. INT’L CONSUMER 
MKT. 158, 160 (2018). See also Jiongen Xiao et al., Cross-Cultural Effects of Self-
Discrepancy on the Consumption of Counterfeit Branded Luxuries, 30 ASIA PAC. J. MKT. 
& LOGISTICS 972, 977 (2018).  
 13. See Jeremy M. Wilson & Rod Kinghorn, The Global Risk of Product 
Counterfeiting: Facilitators of the Criminal Opportunity, A-CAPP BACKGROUNDER 
(January 2015), http://a-capp.msu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/PC_Opportunity_Backgrounder_FINAL.pdf. See also Kaleel 
Rahman et al., Fakes and Fashion: Understanding the Counterfeit Crisis in the Middle 
East, 10 EUR. ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 90, 92 (2013) (explaining how factors such as 
fashion changes, trialability, superior quality, and household usability can affect attitudes 
towards counterfeit).  
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counterfeits is broad and can include harm to the brand owner/victim, the 
economic development of a country, and the health and safety of the 
consumer.14   
Governments worldwide continue to note the harm that is coming to 
their countries from counterfeit goods, including the U.S. government.15 
Often, counterfeiting is: (1) either not criminalized or not enforced; (2) 
either unofficially sanctioned by the government or is allowed to occur 
because of corruption;16 or (3) some combination of the prior two.  In any 
of these cases, arguably harm is still occurring within that country, either 
economically or physically to its citizens.  Harm to the consumer can be 
seen in many forms—from dissatisfaction with the quality of a purchase 
to negative effects on health, up to death.17   
Additionally, product counterfeiting’s connection to other criminal 
activity is present, but often difficult to prove or even research.  Some 
recent efforts to show linkages or patterns between criminal activity has 
shown that concurrent charges with counterfeiting includes: conspiracy, 
trafficking and distribution/sale of counterfeits, possession, and 
smuggling;18 while those arrested for counterfeiting were charged prior 
with trafficking, sale, possession or distribution of illicit drugs, fraud, 
  
 14. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-216, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
AGENCIES CAN IMPROVE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS RISKS POSED BY CHANGING COUNTERFEIT 
MARKETS 8 (2018). See also BASCAP & INTA¸ FRONTIER ECONOMICS, THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY 41–51 (2017) (discussing the econometric 
analysis of impacts on economic growth); Wilson & Kinghorn, supra note 13.  
 15. See Memorandum on Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated 
Goods, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 203 (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-combating-trafficking-
counterfeit-pirated-goods/ (discussing the need to expand U.S. anti-counterfeiting efforts 
because of the harm to the U.S.) [hereinafter 2019 Counterfeit Memorandum]. See 
generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34292, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2015) (emphasizing the importance of enforcing intellectual 
property rights as a component of US international trade policy). 
 16. Wilson & Kinghorn, supra note 13. 
 17. BASCAP & INTA, supra note 14, at 51; GAO-18-216, supra note 14, at 8; 
Hearing on Counterfeits and Their Impact on Consumer Health and Safety Before the 
U.S. S.Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statement of David Hirschmann, 
President & CEO, Glob. Intellectual Property Ctr. of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).  
 18. JAY KENNEDY, A-CAPP CENTER PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING DATABASE: 
INSIGHTS INTO CONVERGING CRIMES 6 (2019), http://a-capp.msu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/Converging-Crimes-FINAL-2.pdf. 
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white-collar crime, and occupational offending, intellectual property 
crimes or counterfeiting, property crimes; crimes against a person;19 and 
in a smaller percentage but more serious area, some were linked to 
terrorist activities.20  
II. Global Legal Framework to Prosecute or Remedy Trademark 
Counterfeiting: U.S. and the Middle East 
Globally, legal frameworks to either prosecute in criminal courts or 
allow for civil suits for trademark counterfeiting exist, but in many cases 
are (1) not being used for a variety of reasons;21 (2) being used only 
occasionally not touching the extent of the actual problem; (3) not strong 
enough to have any type of punishment or deterrent for offenders; (4) 
inaccessible or difficult to use for the brand owners; (5) in a corrupt legal 
systems; or (6) not worth the time and resources to go through the legal 
process because the brand prosecutors are not incentivized to use it.   
  
 19. Id. at 5. 
 20. Id. at 6 (“The category of ‘Other Offenses’ served as a catchall for a litany of 
illegal behaviors, including crimes of smuggling, selling or purchasing an illegal firearm, 
prostitution, possession of an illegal assault weapon, selling fraudulent passports, and as 
mentioned above the identified links to terrorist activities. While these individuals 
represent less than 1% of all the individuals in our database, their activities have the 
potential to have far reaching consequences. In addition to counterfeiting, these 
individuals were concurrently charged with providing material support (weapons) for 
terrorism, and the financing of terrorism and terrorist organizations.”). See also Senator 
Collins Chairs Hearing Detailing Link Between Sale of Counterfeit Goods and 
Hezbollah, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE HOMELAND SECURITY & GOV’T AFF. (May 25, 
2005), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/minority-media/senator-collins-chairs-
hearing-detailing-link-between-sale-of-counterfeit-goods-and-hezbollah; Michael 
Schidlow, Counterfeit Goods: Money Laundering in Plain Sight (Part I — The Risks), 
LEGAL EXECUTIVE INSTITUTE (June 28, 2018), 
http://www.legalexecutiveinstitute.com/counterfeit-goods-money-laundering-part-1/; 
Brandon A. Sullivan et al., The Nexus Between Terrorism and Product Counterfeiting in 
the United States, 15 GLOBAL CRIME 357, 357 (2015), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17440572.2014.919227?needAccess=true. 
See generally, Douglas T. Cannon, War through Pharmaceuticals: How Terrorist 
Organizations are Turning to Counterfeit Medicine to Fund Their Illicit Activity, 47 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 343 (2015).  
 21. See, e.g., Kari Kammel et al., The Crime of Product Counterfeiting: A Legal 
Analysis of the Usage of State Level Statutes, 18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 125, 152 
(2019); Wilson & Kinghorn, supra note 13.  
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Although studies have not yet been done in this area, it is well known 
that prosecutions are largely non-existent and arguably ineffective.22  
Furthermore, while civil suits can be made against other legitimate 
companies, civil suits against illicit counterfeiters are problematic for a 
variety of reasons, including whether they are a registered legitimate 
company, whether they exist at all as a company, where they are located, 
and where they keep their resources.  An effect of all the above reasons 
is that from a risk perspective, trademark counterfeiting is low risk and 
high reward—much less risky and more money than drugs, weapons or 
other types of illicit trafficking.23   
While the global impact of anti-counterfeiting efforts is still relatively 
unknown and tenuous, it is worth reviewing what de facto and de lege 
anti-counterfeiting legislation in a comparative look at the global 
framework, the U.S., and the U.A.E. as a starting point.  
  
 22. See Kammel et al., supra note 21, at 137 fig. 4 (noting the declining rate of 
state level convictions in the U.S. over a ten-year period).  At the U.S. Federal level, the 
U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator reported to Congress that: 
[A]t the end of FY 2018, the FBI had 195 pending IPR investigations . . . . [I]n FY 2018, 
the FBI initiated 54 new investigations, made 22 arrests, obtained 12 convictions, 
forfeitures totaling $3,176,949, and restitutions totaling $64,549,217; in FY 2017, the 
number of CBP and HSI IPR seizures increased more than eight percent, to 34,143 (from 
31,560 in FY 2016). The total estimated Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) 
of the seized goods, had they been genuine, was $1,206,382,219; in FY 2017, ICE-HSI 
initiated 713 intellectual property investigations and had 457 arrests, 288 indictments, 
and 240 convictions.  
U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENF’T COORDINATOR, ANNUAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 18 (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/IPEC-2018-Annual-Intellectual-Property-Report-to-
Congress.pdf. Despite the convictions obtained at both the U.S. state and federal levels, 
the numbers do not appear to come close to dealing with the various estimates of the 
scope and scale of the global counterfeiting problem. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation 
and Development [OECD], Trends in Trade in Pirated and Counterfeit Goods, at 45 
(2019), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/g2g9f533-
en.pdf?expires=1570725918&id=id&accname=ocid177642&checksum=F0F69A833161
6D89817BE299B7076D52 (estimating that in 2016 counterfeiting made up 3.3% of 
world trade) [hereinafter OCED, Trends in Trade]. 
 23. See Erwin A. Blackstone et al., The Health and Economic Effects of 
Counterfeit Drugs, 7 AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 216, 220–21 (2014) (discussing 
incentives and penalties for trademark counterfeiting).  
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A. Global Legal Efforts to Protect Trademarks and Prevent 
Counterfeits 
A variety of international treaties and conventions exist for the 
protection of intellectual property and, specifically, trademarks.  
Trademark treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO)24 include the Paris Convention,25 the Madrid 
Agreement (Marks),26 the Madrid Protocol,27 the Nice Agreement,28 the 
Vienna Agreement,29 the Singapore Treaty,30 and the Trademark Law 
Treaty.31   
Additionally, the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) addresses 
trademark counterfeiting and sets up general principles for the protection 
of intellectual property rights.32 However, the Agreement still makes it 
necessary for countries to enact implementing national legislation on the 
topics of “rules for obtaining evidence, for provisional court orders, for 
  
 24. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wipo.int/portal/en/ (last visited August 27, 2019). 
 25. See generally Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 
20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 26. See generally Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration 
of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, WIPO Lex, 
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/textdetails/12599. 
 27. See generally Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Marks, adopted on Jun. 27, 1989, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-
41, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/283529 (allowing for an international registration of 
trademark) [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]. 
 28. See generally Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of 
Goods and Services for the Purpose of the Registration of Marks, Jun. 15, 1957, 828 
U.N.T.S. 191, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/287437. 
 29. See generally Vienna Agreement Establishing an International Classification 
of the Figurative Elements of Marks, adopted on May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/294836. 
 30. See generally Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, Mar. 27, 2006, 
2263 U.N.T.S. 3, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/290013. 
 31. See generally Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27, 1994, 2037 U.N.T.S. 35, 
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/294358. 
 32. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights arts. 
46, 51, 59, 61, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
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injunctions, damages and other remedies, and for measures at the border 
and criminal sanctions.”33  
B. United States Legislation  
The U.S. Congress has enacted various trademark legislation over the 
past 150 years34 with the current legislation including the Lanham Act,35 
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act,36 the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act,37 the Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act,38 the Anti-
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,39 the Stop Counterfeiting in 
Manufactured Goods Act,40 and the Prioritizing Resources and 
Organization for Intellectual Property (PRO-IP) Act.41 This rich history 
of protection of intellectual property is more developed than in other 
countries and stems from the U.S. cultural heritage.42  
  
 33. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ipenforcement_e.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 
2019). 
 34. For a brief history of these U.S. federal trademark laws, see generally Jeremy 
M. Wilson et al., Product Counterfeiting Legislation in the United States: A Review and 
Assessment of Characteristics, Remedies, and Penalties, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
521, 527–34 (2016). 
 35. See generally Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072, 
1091–96, 1051, 1058, 1111–27, 1141 (2018). 
 36. See generally Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 18. U.S.C. § 2320 
(2018). 
 37. See generally Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2018) 
(implementing the Madrid Protocol). 
 38. See generally Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, 18 
U.S.C. § 2311 (2018) (allowing for the prosecution of an organization trafficking in 
counterfeit goods under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2018)).  
 39. See generally Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d) (2018). 
 40. See generally Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act, Pub. L. No. 
109-181, 120 Stat. 285 (2006) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2018)). 
 41. See generally Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual 
Property (Pro-IP) Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (2008) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8101 (2018)). 
 42. See generally Irene Kosturakis, Intellectual Property 101, 46 TEX. J. BUS. L. 
37, 38–40 (2014) (discussing the early historical development of intellectual property 
right in the thirteen colonies and U.S. Constitution). 
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While the U.S. is one of the more active countries in creating 
legislation for the protection of counterfeiting, prosecution or filing suit 
remains a limited option for a variety of reasons at the federal level.  For 
example, per the April 2019 Presidential Memorandum,43 the U.S. 
Department of Commerce put out a Comment Request on the Report on 
the State of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods Trafficking and 
Recommendations in the Federal Register, with one of the items 
requested being to “identify appropriate administrative, statutory, 
regulatory, or other changes, including enhanced enforcement actions, 
that could substantially reduce trafficking in counterfeit and pirated 
goods or promote more effective law enforcement regarding trafficking 
in such goods.”44  After Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., in which the court 
held that eBay was not liable to Tiffany for contributory trademark 
infringement for the sale of counterfeit goods on its platform,45 
companies have held off on filing civil suits at least against e-commerce 
platforms, while the problem of counterfeiting sales online continues to 
skyrocket.46  
The Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes Manual, published by 
the Office of Legal Education Executive Office for United States 
Attorneys, notes that charging decisions should be made if the prosecutor 
“believes that the person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense and that 
the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain 
a conviction.”47 In the U.S., brand owners can also seek exclusion orders 
  
 43. See 2019 Counterfeit Memorandum, supra note 15. 
 44. Comment Request, 84 Fed. Reg. 32861 (proposed Jul. 10, 2019).  
 45. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 46. See Matthew J. Clark, Leveeing a Flood of Counterfeits on Amazon, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/20
18-19/january-february/leveeing-flood-counterfeits-amazon/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2019); 
Morgan Forde, US E-Commerce Platforms Struggle to Rein in Counterfeit Products, 
SUPPLY CHAIN DIVE (July 23, 2019), https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/us-e-
commerce-platforms-counterfeit-products/559316/;  
Roomy Khan, Counterfeits - Amazon, Etsy, eBay, Instagram, and Others Duping 
Consumers and Damaging Innovation, FORBES (May 10, 2019, 4:12 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/roomykhan/2019/05/10/counterfeits-amazon-etsy-ebay-
instagram-and-others-duping-consumers-and-damaging-innovation/#44f7427a6002. 
 47. H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL., PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CRIMES 377 (4th ed. 2013), (citing U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (USAM) ch. 9-27.220). 
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of trademark counterfeits through the International Trade under Section 
337 of the Tariff Act 1930.48 Federal criminal cases are not always filed 
for a variety of reasons, and are sometimes referred to the state level or 
local U.S. courts.49   
  
The USAM was replaced in 2018 by the Justice Manual, which states regarding charging 
decisions: 
Section 2320 is not intended to criminalize every trademark infringement for which 
remedies may exist under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. It is intended to 
deal vigorously with the burgeoning and increasingly lucrative trade in outright copies of 
well-known trademarked merchandise. The 1996 amendments are intended to focus 
prosecutive attention on the growing problems associated with the unlawful importation 
of counterfeit trademarked goods, and violations tied to organized criminal behavior and 
criminal enterprises. 
Justice Manual § 1702 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2018). 
 48. See generally Tariff Act of 1930 § 1337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2018) (discussing 
an illegal activity as the “importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or 
the sale within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, 
of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States trademark registered under 
the Trademark Act of 1946.”). 
 49. See H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL, supra note 47, at 377 (quoting USAM ch. 
9-27.220). 
Ordinarily, the prosecutor “should commence or recommend Federal prosecution if 
he/she believes that the person’s conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the 
admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.” . . . . 
This directive is not absolute. Even a provable case may be declined in three situations: 
when prosecution would serve no substantial federal interest; when the person is subject 
to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or when there exists an adequate non-
criminal alternative to prosecution . . . . Broken down further, the relevant considerations 
include: 
xThe federal interest in intellectual property crimes. 
xFederal law enforcement priorities. 
xThe nature and seriousness of the offense. 
xThe deterrent effect of prosecution. 
xThe individual’s culpability in connection with the offense. 
xThe individual’s criminal history. 
xThe individual’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or 
xprosecution of others. 
xThe probable sentence and other consequences of conviction. 
xWhether the person is subject to prosecution in another jurisdiction. 
xThe adequacy of alternative non-criminal remedies. 
xSpecial considerations for deciding whether to charge corporations. Id.  
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Further, at the U.S. state level, all fifty U.S. states have a statute 
allowing for civil suits, injunctions, and monetary damages.50 Forty-nine 
of the fifty U.S. states have criminal statutes protecting trademarks,51 
mostly anti-counterfeiting,52 but some forgery,53 criminal simulation,54 
  
 50. See Wilson et al., supra note 34, at 536 (describing survey of state civil laws, 
including policy characteristics and damages). See also ALA. CODE § 8-12-18 (1980); 
ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.180 (1961); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1985 (2005); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 4-71-214 (1997); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14250 (West 2007); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 6-1-109 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11i (West 1963); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 6, § 3314 (1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.141 (West 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451 
(1893); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482-33 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-514 (West 
1996); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1036/70 (1998); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 425/4 (1986); IND. 
CODE. § 24-2-1-14 (1955); IOWA CODE § 548.114 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-215 
(1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.603 (West 1994); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:223 (1954); 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 1531 (1980); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 1-414 (West 1992); 
MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 110H, §§ 12, 13 (LexisNexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 429.43 
(1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.29 (West 1959); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-27 (1997); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 417.061 (1973); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-335 (1979); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 30-13-335 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-141 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
600.430 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:13 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.16 
(West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3B-16 (West 1997); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-m 
(McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-11 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-22-12 (1957); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1329.66 (West 1978); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, § 32 (1959); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 647.105 (West 1961); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1125 (1982); 6 R.I. GEN.  LAWS 
§ 6-2-13 (1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1170 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-6-24 
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-514 (1982); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN § 16.104 
(West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-3a-404 (West 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2529 
(1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-92.13 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.150 (West 
2003); W. VA. CODE § 47-2-14 (1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 132.033 (West 1985); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-1-112 (1965). 
 51. See Wilson, et al, supra note 30, at 543–44 n. 109.  
 52. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1453 (1998); CAL. PENAL CODE § 350 (West 
1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-110.5 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-347a (West 
1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 926 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-454 (1996); HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 708-875 (West 1997); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3614 (West 1972); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3615 (West 1972); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 620/3.16 (1985); 765 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 1040/4 (1955); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.  425/2 (1986); 815 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 425/3 (1986); IOWA CODE § 714.26 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5825 (2010); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §365.241 (West 2000); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:229 (1984); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-611 (LexisNexis 1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 147 
(LexisNexis 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.263 (1931); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.42 
(West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.895 (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-21-53 
(West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-21-55 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-21-57 
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and theft of trademarks,55 with New Mexico being the only one without a 
general statute.56  However, in this case, the use of these statutes is also 
very low, and the exact reasons why it has yet to be studied.57   
  
(West 2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 570.103 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-338 (2009); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.205 (West 1911); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.210 (West 
1911); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:6-b (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-32 (West 
1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.71-74 (LexisNexis 1992); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 
33.07 (LexisNexis 1983); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 33.09 (LexisNexis 1983); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 80-11.1 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-04 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2913.34 (West 1997); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1990.2 (1999); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 647.140 
(West 1999); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 647.145 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 647.150 
(West 1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4119 (West 1996); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-17-
13 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1190 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-6-2 (1939); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-6-3 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-152 (2000); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 32.23 (West 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2530 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 
59.1-92.13 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.16.020 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9.16.030 (West 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.16.035 (West 1999); W. VA. 
CODE § 47-2-14a (1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 132.02 (West 1985); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-
3-610 (1982). 
 53. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 831.032 (West 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-454 
(1996); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3614 (West 1972); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3615 (West 
1972); IND. CODE § 35-43-5-2(d) (1976). 
 54. See ALA. CODE § 13A-9-10 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.530 (1978); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-37-213 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-110 (1963); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 708-855 (West 1972); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.110 (West 1974); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 705 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-606 (1977); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2913.32 (West 1972); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.037 (West 1971); 18 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4102 (West 1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-115 (1989); TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.22 (West 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-518 (LexisNexis 
1973). 
 55. See ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10.4 (1975); IND. CODE § 35-43-4-1(a) (1976); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-2(a) (West 1976). 
 56. Wilson et al., supra note 34, at 543. But cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-1-6 (1972) 
(dealing specifically with pharmaceuticals, medical devices and cosmetics). 
 57. See Kammel et al., supra note 21, at 136 (noting that only twenty-seven states 
tracked convictions under their trademark counterfeiting statutes, and over a ten-year 
period of those that tracked three had no convictions, two-thirds had less than 100, and 
New York have over 3000).  
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C. Middle East Legal Perceptions of Intellectual Property & 
Trademark Counterfeiting 
As the U.S. is a complex legal system made up of America’s 
historical roots in England and elsewhere, Middle Eastern Law, a 
relatively recent scholarly construct, has a complex history that has 
interacted with and is complimentary of Arabic law, Oriental law, 
Muslim (or Islamic, shari’a, or fiqh) law, North African law, Near 
Eastern law, and occasionally Southwest Asian law.58  Chibli & Revkin 
note that, “[l]ike other attempts to reduce a complex, multilayered, deep 
legacy to a silver-bullet theory explaining progress or stagnation because 
of Islamic law,[] the one-size-fits-all thesis is enticing and sometimes 
brilliant, but is it perforce overbroad.”59 These scholars note that 
currently, “the more real constraints that the commercial lawyer is likely 
to face have more to do with persistent family legal structures in most 
business ventures . . . and with the heavy hand wielded by authoritarian, 
rentier, nepotistic, and kleptomaniac rulers, combined with Western 
obsession with Middle East oil.”60  This legal culture creates a very 
different environment for the protection of trademarks and the 
prosecution of trademark counterfeits, which many Western brands may 
have experienced with frustration.  
i. United Arab Emirates Fighting Counterfeits—But Are 
They Successful?  
The United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) consists of seven Emirates: Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Ras Al Khaimah, Umm al-Quwain and 
Fujairah and has become the location of choice in the Middle East for 
sales and marketing of many multi-national brands.61 Dubai, in 
particular, is an international trade center, with the Jebal Ali Port in 
  
 58. Chibli Mallat & Mara Revkin, Middle Eastern Law, 9 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. 
SCI. 405, 406 (2013). 
 59. Id. at 423. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Omar Obeidat et al., Procedures and Strategies for Anti-Counterfeiting: 
United Arab Emirates, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/anti-counterfeiting/procedures-and-strategies-
anti-counterfeiting-united-arab-emirates.  
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Dubai handing most of the UAE’s 20 million containers a year in 
transit.62 Additionally, Dubai’s state-of-the-art transport and free-zone 
infrastructure make it attractive for business and trade, but also for 
counterfeit shipment and transit.63   
UAE is one of the most active countries in the Middle East in 
combating trademark counterfeiting.64  The UAE has enacted trademark 
laws, and its anti-counterfeiting law is found in Articles 37 and 38 of the 
Federal Trademark Law.65  Most recently, in December of 2016, the 
U.A.E. enacted a new federal law on “Combatting Commercial Fraud,” 
which increased the maximum penalty for counterfeiting to AED 1 
million (~US$275,000) for pharmaceutical and food products and AED 
250,000 (~ US$68,000) for other products, up from AED 10,000 
(approx. US$2,700).66 
Additionally, brand owners can file a civil case against a counterfeiter 
under the UAE Trademark Law.67 Another option available to brands is 
administrative actions, which are issued by the Department of Economic 
Development (DED) in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah and by the 
Ministry of Economy in the remaining Emirates, which allow brands to 
register trademarks for monitoring and the ability to file complaints.68  
  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Trademark Law, Federal Law No. 37, art. 37, 38 (1992) (UAE), amended 
by Federal Law No. 8 (2002) (U.A.E.) (concerning trademarks). See also Bashir Ahmed 
& Saurbh Kothari, Doing Business in the United Arab Emirates: Overview, AFRIDI & 
ANGELL (2015/2016), http://afridi-angell.com/knowledge_detail.php?ids=199. 
 66. See Paul Allen, New Law to Combat Counterfeiting: What Does it Mean for 
Businesses and Brand Owners?, DLA PIPER  (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/oman/insights/publications/2017/01/new-law-to-combat-
counterfeiting-uae/. The AED is the currency code for the Dirhams, the currency of the 
UAE. See AED - Emirati Dirham, XE, https://www.xe.com/currency/aed-emirati-dirham 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2019). See also Combatting Commercial Fraud Law, Federal Law 
No. 19 (2016) (UAE); UAE Issues New Law on Combating Commercial Fraud, INCE 
(Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.incegd.com/en/knowledge-bank/uae-issues-new-law-on-
combating-commercial-fraud. 
 67. Federal Law No. 37, art. 37, 38 (UAE); Federal Law No. 8, art. 40 (UAE). 
 68. See Yasser Masood, United Arab Emirates: Anti-Counterfeiting in The 
United Arab Emirates, MONDAQ (Apr. 5, 2019), 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/795256/Trademark/AntiCounterfeiting+in+the+United+Arab
+Emirates.  See also Ahmad Zaza, How to Benefit from Trademark Protection Before the 
Dubai Department of Economic Development (DED), TAMIMI.COM (Sept. 2015), 
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However, the UAE is still a top provenance and transit country for 
counterfeit goods.  The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”) Report of 2019 notes that in the years 2014-
2016, the UAE was the third top provenance countries for counterfeit 
goods in terms of share of seized value and share of customs seizures.69  
The 2019 OECD report also notes that key provenance economies of 
counterfeit trade where locations where “the actual production of 
infringing goods is taking place and economies that function as a point of 
transit through which infringing goods pass.”70 Additionally, the report 
notes that counterfeiters  
[T]end to ship counterfeit products via complex trade routes, using 
several transit points. This is done for several reasons, including:  
x “Cleansing” of all the documents and camouflaging the original 
point of production and/or departure. 
x Establishing distribution centres for counterfeit and pirated goods 
(e.g. in free trade zones) and for transhipping them in smaller orders to 
their final destination points. 
x Processing of products, usually in free trade areas, often by adding 
counterfeit 
x trademarks and/or repackaging or re-labelling goods.71 
Additionally,  in regard to enforcement of intellectual property from a 
U.S. perspective, the UAE remains on the U.S. Trade Representatives 
Annual Section 301 report for failing “to address concerns related to IP 




 69. OCED, Trends in Trade, supra note 22, at 40 fig. 4.1.  
 70. Id. at 42. 
 71. Id. See also Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
Mapping the Real Routes of Trade in Fake Goods, at 13 (2017), 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/mapping-the-real-routes-of-trade-in-fake-goods-
9789264278349-en.htm [hereinafter OCED, Mapping the Real Routes]. 
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pharmaceuticals and medical devices” because it did “not provide 
adequate or effective border enforcement against counterfeit and pirated 
goods . . . [as] the customs officials lack authority to take action to seize 
and destroy goods at the border.”72  The UAE is still reported as one of 
the most active locations for counterfeit goods, including as a 
provenance economy.73   
III. FREE TRADE ZONES, COUNTERFEITS, CORRUPTION AND CULTURE: 
EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
There are many overlaying features and elements to examine that can 
give an insight into how and why a legal culture exists—in this section, 
this Paper will explore some of the features and elements present in the 
United Arab Emirates.  This section will explore FTZs, corruption, and 
the element of hawala.  
A.  Free Trade Zones  
The impact that Free Trade Zones, or FTZs, play in illicit trade is still 
largely unmeasured. But, the reduction in regulation and anecdotal 
stories notes by brand and law enforcement shows that while it facilitates 
trade, it also facilitates the movement of counterfeit goods as well.74 The 
principal features of the different types of FTZs are that they: (1) “are 
geographically delimited, usually physically secured areas;” (2) “offer 
benefits based upon physical location within the zone,” and (3) 
“represent separate, duty-free customs areas.”75 According to the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), there are “over 3,500 zones in 
  
 72. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT, at p. 7 (2019). See also 
Fouad Egbaria, USTR Special Section 301 Report Identifies 36 Countries for IP 
Infringement Watch Lists, METALMINER (May 1, 2019), 
https://agmetalminer.com/2019/05/01/ustr-special-section-301-report-identifies-36-
countries-for-ip-infringement-watch-lists/ 
 73. OCED, Mapping the Real Routes, supra note 71, at 30, 36, 43, 50, 73.  
 74. See OCED, Trends in Trade, supra note 22, at 42. 
 75. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Development [OECD], Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods and Free Trade Zones: Evidence from Recent Trends, at 16 (2018), 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264289550-en [hereinafter OECD, Evidence from Recent 
Trends]. 
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130 economies today.”76 A study by the OECD and EUIPO confirms that 
“lightly regulated FTZs are also attractive to parties engaged in illegal 
and criminal activities, such as trade in counterfeit and pirated products 
or smuggling and money laundering, as these zones offer a relatively safe 
environment with both good infrastructure and limited oversight.”77 
While there are many benefits for host economies and businesses,78 there 
are also unique challenges that exist, such as the increase of trademark 
counterfeits.79 A 2019 OECD study noted that counterfeiters use FTZs 
for establishing distribution centers for their counterfeit product.80 
Additionally, the Anti-Counterfeiting Committee of the International 
Trademark Association (INTA), made up of trademark practitioners 
globally, noted results of a survey of practitioners that “in countries 
where FTZs are present, specific regulations usually exist to allow for IP 
enforcement within those zones and with regards to goods in transit. 
However, in practice, the activities of enforcing those IP rights appear to 
be relatively low.”81 Additionally, with the increase of FTZs both in 
quantity and size, customs seizure are also increasing.82  In summary, 
like the development of technology, FTZs serve a beneficial purpose in 
increasing the flow of trade and ease of business transactions, but on the 
flip side this convenience and expediency also creates a ripe environment 
of which counterfeiters can take advantage.   
  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 13 (confirming the links between FTZs and trade in counterfeit 
products. The existence, number and size of FTZs in a country correlate with increases in 
the value of counterfeit and pirated products exported by that country’s economy). The 
report later provides more data on FTZs and counterfeit goods. See id. at 41-54.  
 78. Id. at 21. 
 79. OCED, Mapping the Real Routes, supra note 71, at 19. See also 
Anticounterfeiting Committee Survey Points to Need for Enforcement in Free Trade 
Zones, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N BULLETIN (Sept. 1, 2019),  
https://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/ACC_-committee_update_01_7415.aspx. X 
[hereinafter Anticounterfeiting Committee Survey]. 
 80. OCED, Trends in Trade, supra note 22, at 42. 
 81. Anticounterfeiting Committee Survey, supra note 79.  
 82. See OECD, Evidence from Recent Trends, supra note 75, at 51 (noting each 
additional FTZ within an economy is associated with a 5.9 percent increase in the value 
of fake exports). 
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B. Corruption’s Impact Seen in the UAE  
Understanding corruption and how it plays into Middle Eastern legal 
systems can have an impact on how multinational corporations approach 
their legal cases regarding trademark counterfeiting.  Additionally, it is 
of vital importance to have a local on-the-ground network in the Middle 
East, consisting of lawyers, investigators, and others who might aid in 
intelligence gathering or preparing other information.83  Despite all of 
these necessary preparations, it is also important to be aware of the 
impact of corruption, in any jurisdiction.  Here, corruption in the UAE 
will be examined.  While, “[c]onventional approaches to fighting 
corruption, such as legal and administrative reforms that promote 
democratization, transparency, and the rule of law risk missing some key 
factors that contribute to popular perceptions of corruption.”84   
In Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index of 
2018, the Middle East and North Africa continue to have systemic 
corruption, which weakens its institutions.85  The UAE leads the region 
(meaning it has less corruption than other Middle Eastern countries) with 
scores of seventy, while others such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya are in 
the bottom five of the index.86 Additionally, investigations by the 
Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and the 
Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) show that Dubai is an 
active global hub for money laundering87 and continues to use a largely 
unregulated system called hawala, which is often cited as a mechanism 
  
 83. Customs, Consumers, and Cooperation: How to Fight Fakes in the Middle 
East’s Free Trade Zones, INTA BULLETIN (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/Anticounterfeiting_in_the_Middle_East_Interv
iew_7303.aspx.  
 84. Yazan Doughan, Corruption in the Middle East and the Limits of 
Conventional Approaches, GIGA FOCUS MIDDLE EAST (Sept. 2017), https://www.giga-
hamburg.de/en/publication/corruption-in-the-middle-east-and-the-limits-of-conventional-
approaches. 
 85. Middle East & North Africa: Corruption Continues as Institutions and 
Political Rights Weaken, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/regional-analysis-MENA.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Karina Shedrofsky, Dubai’s Golden Sands, ORGANIZED CRIME & 
CORRUPTION REPORTING PROJECT (June 12, 2018), 
https://www.occrp.org/en/goldensands/dubais-golden-sands. 
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for the flow of criminal financing but can be much more complex if 
understood in its cultural context.88   
Because corruption and illicit trafficking of counterfeit goods are 
inherently linked,89 those looking to prevent trademark counterfeits in the 
UAE either as a transit, destination or provenance economy must 
understand this impact, since it will have an effect on their enforcement 
activities.  Despite this, or perhaps because of it, the UAE government 
has taken recent steps to increase its anti-corruption legislation and 
penalties. Corruption and bribery are prohibited by Federal Law No. 3 of 
1987 of the UAE Criminal Code, which covers all seven Emirates and 
applies to the FTZs, which have jurisdiction to enact civil and 
commercial laws, but not criminal laws.90  While the impact of these 
changes have yet to be seen, at least the lex lata of the UAE is now 
aligned with international best practices at the UN Convention Against 
Corruption.91  
  
 88. Hawala is an ancient banking practice, which comes from Islamic traditions 
and is essentially based on a trust system that allows a party to transfer or remit money 
quickly and cheaply without a bank.  Dulve M. Redín et al., Exploring the Ethical 
Dimension of Hawala, 124 J. BUS. ETHICS  327, 327-37 (2014).  “[H]awaladars’ 
perception of what is ‘illicit’ or ‘criminal’ may differ from that of global regulators, 
especially in contexts where many activities deemed criminal by the Western world, from 
what Goodhand (2005) has identified as the ‘coping’ or ‘survival’ economy.” Id. at 330–
31.  Hawala is not in its essence a part of organized crime, corruption or bribery, but like 
any other traditional financial mechanism is used for criminal transactions.  See id. at 
334.  
 89. Counterfeit Products Trafficking, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME 
(Apr. 2018), https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-3/key-
issues/counterfeit-products-trafficking.html (“Corruption and bribery are inherently 
linked to the illicit trafficking of counterfeit goods, especially when these are shipped 
internationally. Trafficking in counterfeit goods also offers criminals a complementary 
source of income and a tool to launder proceeds derived from various crimes. In a similar 
fashion, proceeds from other crimes have been used by organized criminal groups to 
finance their counterfeiting businesses.”). 
 90. Adam Vause & Zara Merali, The UAE’s Fight Against Bribery and 
Corruption, DLA PIPER (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/dubai/insights/publications/2019/07/the-uaes-fight-against-
bribery-and-corruption/. 
 91. Richard J. Gibbon, United Arab Emirates Modernizes Bribery and 
Corruption Legislation, NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (June 21, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/united-arab-emirates-modernizes-bribery-and-
corruption-legislation. See generally GA Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (2003), United 
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With all of the above, understanding the legal structure, corruption, 
and cultural impacts on the legal system, such as hawala, are important 
to understand the environment in which counterfeiting is occurring in the 
UAE. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION 
REGARDING THE EVOLUTION OF TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING IN 
RELATION TO TECHNOLOGY 
The prior sections of this Paper discussed and explored the harm 
caused by trademark counterfeiting and the need in various countries to 
be able to enforce trademark rights through a legal system of both civil 
and criminal laws and regulations.  Next, the trademark counterfeiting 
legal framework of the U.S. and UAE, two countries having some of the 
stronger intellectual property regimes in the world, were examined to see 
not only some of their strengths, but some major challenges they face, 
whether it be lack of use of existing statutes, corruption, culture, or 
FTZs.  However, despite these challenges, both the U.S. and the U.A.E. 
continue to push forward new legislation and new areas in which to be 
able to protect their citizens and brands from trademark counterfeiting. It 
is yet to be seen what type of impact the legal changes will have on 
trademark counterfeiting, and one important consideration which this 
Paper has not yet explored—the role that law will play with 
technological innovation. This leads to the final section of this Paper—
examining technological advances and their relationship to the evolution 
of the trade in counterfeit goods.   
The law has not caught up with technology in the majority of 
jurisdictions and may never do so with the rapid rate of technological 
innovation.92 As one author notes, some technologies can be considered 
  
Nations Convention Against Corruption (Oct. 31, 2003). The UAE ratified the 
Convention on February 22, 2006.  See UN Convention Against Corruption Signature 
and Ratification Status, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS AND CORRUPTION, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/ratification-status.html (last visited Dec. 21, 
2019). 
 92. Daniel Malan, The Law Can’t Keep Up With New Tech. Here’s How to Close 
the Gap, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (June 21, 2018), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/law-too-slow-for-new-tech-how-keep-up/. See 
generally William Sowers, How do you Solve a Problem like Law-Disruptive 
Technology?, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 193 (2019).  
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“law disruptive technologies,” and gives examples such as the gig 
economy, 3D printing and driverless cars.93 The concept of law-
disruptive technology has 3 components: (1) it must involve a new or 
improved technology; (2) it must have the potential to make a significant 
economic or societal impact; and (3) it does not fit into the current legal 
framework.94 This Paper argues that e-commerce platforms, the sale of 
product via social media apps, and the dark web could all be law 
disruptive technologies.  
First, e-commerce platforms are growing rapidly in the U.S., China, 
and even now to other areas, such as the Middle East.95 In looking at the 
three-prong test, e-commerce is (1) new technology that allows 
consumers and retailers to meet anywhere in the world with no barriers 
to access;96 (2) e-commerce has had major economic and societal 
impacts;97 and (3) the laws that apply to trademark counterfeiting in brick 
and mortar situations do not fit into the e-commerce scenario in most of 
the current legal framework globally.98 However, some countries are 
starting to enact laws specifically for the complex e-commerce 
  
 93. Sowers, supra note 92, at 199–200.  
 94. Id. at 196.   
 95. J. Clement, Online Shopping Behavior in the United States - Statistics & 
Facts, STATISTA (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.statista.com/topics/2477/online-shopping-
behavior/; Online Retail is Booming in China, ECONOMIST (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2017/10/26/online-retail-is-booming-in-china; 
Gabriela Barkho, Amazon Launches Its First Middle East E-Commerce Website, 
OBSERVER (May 1, 2019, 5:30 PM), https://observer.com/2019/05/amazon-middle-east-
ecommerce-website/. 
 96. See Alexandro Pando, How Technology Is Redefining E-Commerce, FORBES 
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/03/06/how-
technology-is-redefining-e-commerce/#750d5b3862e3. 
 97. See, e.g., Abdul Gaffar Khan, Electronic Commerce: A Study on Benefits and 
Challenges in an Emerging Economy, 16 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT AND 
BUSINESS RESEARCH, 2016, at 19;  Jamsheer K, Impact of e-Commerce On Society: 
Advantages and Disadvantages, ACOWEBS (Feb. 19, 2019), https://acowebs.com/impact-
ecommerce-society/. 
 98. See E-transactions Legislation Worldwide, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., 
https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/ICT4D-Legislation/eCom-Transactions-
Laws.aspx, (giving an overview of e-commerce legislation of any kind globally and 
noting that 70% of countries have adopted some type of e-commerce laws) (last visited 
Dec. 6, 2019). See also Clark, supra note 46. 
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environment, such as China.99 However, in other countries, such as the 
U.S., courts have continued to decide that e-commerce platforms do not 
have liability for the sale of counterfeit goods on their platforms,100 but 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, as mentioned in its call for comments 
above, is actively seeking input on suggestions for new legislation.101 In 
the U.S., despite flea market or discount market owners being liable for 
the sale of counterfeit goods in the brick and mortar environment,102 that 
argument of contributory trademark infringement liability has not 
crossed over into e-commerce, thus limiting civil claims that the brand 
owner victim can bring against the e-commerce provider. However, a 
recent case out of Pennsylvania extended theories of strict liability to 
Amazon for a case brought by a consumer injured by a faulty product, 
although it has currently been vacated and is pending a rehearing en 
banc.103 Needless to say, the law is underdeveloped and it is logical to 
assume that counterfeiters will take advantage. 
Additionally, the sales of counterfeit goods on social media and on the 
dark web might also meet the three components of the test, as alternative 
venues. Social media counterfeit sales continue to grow with little to no 
  
 99. China’s E-Commerce Law went into effect on January 1, 2019. Zhonghua 
Renming Dianzishangwu Fa (୰ॾேẸඹ࿴ᅜ⭥Ꮚၟ࣑ἲ) [E-Commerce Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Aug. 31, 2018, effective Jan. 1, 2019), arts. 1, 2 (English text available at 
https://ipkey.eu/sites/default/files/documents/resources/PRC_E-Commerce_Law.pdf).  
 100. See, e.g., Tiffany v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that eBay’s 
use of Tiffany’s mark on its website and in sponsored links did not constitute direct 
trademark infringement, nor was there an affirmative duty to remedy the problem, and 
therefore eBay was not liable for contributory trademark infringement for facilitating the 
infringing conduct of counterfeiting vendors).  
 101. Comment Request, 84 Fed. Reg. 32861 (July 10, 2019). 
 102. See Luxottica Grp. v. Airport Mini Mall, LLC., 287 F.Supp.3d 1338, 1347 
(N.D. Ga. 2018) (upholding contributory trademark infringement claim against discount 
mall). 
 103. Circuit Judge, Roth on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, held in part that 
Amazon was the “only member of marketing chain available to customer for redress, as 
factor weighing in favor of finding that operator was a seller”, “imposition of strict 
liability upon [Amazon] would serve as an incentive to safety,” “[Amazon] was in better 
position than customer to prevent circulation of defective products,” and “[Amazon]’s 
ability to distribute the cost of compensating for injuries resulting from product defects 
was factor weighing in favor of finding that [Amazon] was a seller.”  Oberdorf v. 
Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 137-38 (3d. Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 936 
F.3d 182 (3d. Cir. 2019). 
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research done in this area, except by practitioners seeking to enforce their 
marks.104 The Dark Web105 continue to increase with seemingly little 
ability of brands to stop it, although takedowns do occur by the 
government and other agencies.106 Additionally, many anti-counterfeiting 
providers or solutions companies do monitoring and takedowns of 
postings on behalf of the brand owners.107 But these responses are limited 
  
 104. See, e.g., INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, ADDRESSING THE SALE OF COUNTERFEITS 
ON THE INTERNET 8 (2017), 
https://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/2018/Addressing_the_Sale_of_Counterfeits_
on_the_Internet_021518.pdf. See generally Maria C. Morra et al., Original or Counterfeit 
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FASHION MARKETING 24 (2018); Chase Scheinbaum, Technology Aims to Take On Social 
Media’s Illicit Side: TECH: Pharmaceutical Sales, Counterfeit Goods Could Be 
Targeted, 38 SAN DIEGO BUS. J. 7 (2017).  
 105. See A Brief Exploration of the Dark Web, AVG, 
https://www.avg.com/en/signal/what-is-the-dark-web (last visited Dec. 6, 2019). See also 
Brian Thompson, Monster Dark Web Takedown Seizes Up to 620,000 Fake Anxiety 
Meds, Yields NJ’s Largest-Ever Pill Haul: Officials, NBCNEWYORK, 
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Counterfeit-Drug-Ring-Manhattan-Source-508644231.html (last updated Apr. 16, 2019, 
7:36 PM); Man Who Made And Sold Nearly One Million Counterfeit Xanax Pills 
Sentenced, PARTNERSHIP FOR SAFE MEDICINES (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.safemedicines.org/2018/12/man-who-made-and-sold-nearly-one-million-
counterfeit-xanax-pills-sentenced.html.  
 106. SHELLEY, supra note 1, at 241. See also Over a Million Websites Seized in 
Global Operation, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/over-million-websites-seized-global-operation; 
TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI ELAINE ALLUMS, CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS at § 4.10 (Proptibord ed., 2019)  (“In November of 
2018, over 1 million copyright-infringing website domain names 
selling counterfeit automotive parts, electrical components, personal care items and 
other fake goods were criminally and civilly seized by the combined efforts of law 
enforcement agents (ICE’s HSI, Europol, Interpol, police agencies from 26 countries), 
industry representatives and anti-counterfeiting associations worldwide. The operation, 
dubbed Operation in Our Sites, was facilitated by the IPR Center, which is led by U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 33,600 website domain names were criminally 
seized. In addition, industry partners civilly seized 1.21 million domain names and shut 
down 2.2 million erroneous ecommerce links featured on social media platforms and 
third-party marketplaces.”). 
 107. Alternative Strategies for Fighting Counterfeits Online, WORLD TRADEMARK 
REVIEW (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/anti-
counterfeiting/alternative-strategies-fighting-counterfeits-online.  
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and seem to only be reactive responses and not proactive opportunities to 
shut down the illicit trade in goods. 
However, the lex lata legal framework was not created to combat 
counterfeiting in this online environment. Yet, this hodgepodge of laws 
in the U.S. and in the U.A.E. designed for brick and mortar counterfeits 
in legitimate businesses, is often not used at all, enough, or is totally 
ineffective or inapplicable when it comes to the online space.108 In the 
meantime, the global community continues to grow in its reliance and 
use of e-commerce, social media, and other online tools, pages, and apps 
for purchases of both legitimate and illicit products.109 Despite the 
expectation that each country should catch up to the current state of 
affairs with their legal frameworks, how can they do so in a way that is 
forward-thinking regarding technology to predict where the technologies 
will be in two, five, or even ten years? How can they do so with these 
current ‘law-disruptive’ technologies, but also be prepared for similar 
ones to come and at a more rapid pace? 
This daunting task for legislatures worldwide is not just relevant for e-
commerce and social media, but also for some of the technologies that 
overlap with it. For example, artificial intelligence, or AI, is known to be 
used as a technology that help brands with online counterfeit takedowns 
or social media takedowns,110 and is most likely already, or soon to be in 
the near future, used by counterfeiters as well to facilitate sales.111 E-
commerce, social media, artificial intelligence and a host of other 
  
 108. See generally Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 113 (2d Cir. 2010); 
Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 151–53 (2019). 
 109. See Clement, supra note 95 (noting retail e-commerce sales worldwide are 
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 111. Mike Elgan, Fake Products? Only AI Can Save Us Now, COMPUTER WORLD 
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technological advances will continue to change the way trade is done—
both licit and illicit. What and how the governments, brands, and the 
legal community can do to prevent or stem the damage caused by 
trademark counterfeiting in the Middle East, the U.S., and globally 
remains to be seen. 
 
